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Chapters (61)
  1. Title Page
  2. Copyright Page
  3. Dedication
  4. Chapter 1 - Napoleon
  5. Chapter 2 - April 1805
  6. Chapter 3
  7. Chapter 4 - Arthur
  8. Chapter 5
  9. Chapter 6 - Napoleon
  10. Chapter 7 - Paris, September 1805
  11. Chapter 8 - Strasbourg, 24 September 1805
  12. Chapter 9 - Ulm, 16 October 1805
  13. Chapter 10 - Arthur
  14. Chapter 11
  15. Chapter 12
  16. Chapter 13 - Napoleon
  17. Chapter 14
  18. Chapter 15 - Austerlitz, 2 December 1805
  19. Chapter 16 - Arthur
  20. Chapter 17 - Hastings, February 1806
  21. Chapter 18 - Dublin, April 1806
  22. Chapter 19
  23. Chapter 20 - Napoleon
  24. Chapter 21 - Bamberg, 7 October 1806
  25. Chapter 22 - Jena, 13 October 1806
  26. Chapter 23
  27. Chapter 24 - Warsaw, January 1807
  28. Chapter 25 - Eylau, 8 February 1807
  29. Chapter 26 - Arthur
  30. Chapter 27
  31. Chapter 28 - Dublin, April 1807
  32. Chapter 29
  33. Chapter 30
  34. Chapter 31 - Napoleon
  35. Chapter 32
  36. Chapter 33
  37. Chapter 34 - Arthur
  38. Chapter 35
  39. Chapter 36
  40. Chapter 37
  41. Chapter 38 - Napoleon
  42. Chapter 39 - Pamplona, February 1808
  43. Chapter 40
  44. Chapter 41
  45. Chapter 42 - Arthur
  46. Chapter 43 - Mondego Bay, Portugal, 30 July 1808
  47. Chapter 44
  48. Chapter 45
  49. Chapter 46
  50. Chapter 47 - Napoleon
  51. Chapter 48
  52. Chapter 49
  53. Chapter 50 - Arthur
  54. Chapter 51
  55. Chapter 52 - Napoleon
  56. Chapter 53 - Arthur
  57. Chapter 54 - Napoleon
  58. Chapter 55 - Arthur
  59. Chapter 56
  60. Chapter 57
  61. Author’s Note

Of course, there was an ulterior motive for much of his work. Napoleon’s lust for glory meant that he needed an efficient and well-motivated society to support the French war machine. In pursuit of this aim Napoleon was not prepared to brook any opposition and there were severe sanctions for those that corrupted the system, or refused to play their part. There is also little doubt that the power vested in the new imperial throne exacerbated a deep-seated megalomania - a characteristic that Talleyrand correctly saw as the gravest danger posed to France. Napoleon had always considered himself to be singled out by fate for greatness.As a consequence he often had little regard for others, and the hardships he subjected them to. Such people were there to serve his interests. This included not only his wife, but also his brothers and sisters, who were the tools Napoleon used to extend his dynasty across Europe.

Being destiny’s child had some unfortunate consequences for Napoleon. Firstly, it was increasingly difficult for him to accept that he could make a mistake. Accordingly, blame for his errors was lavished on his subordinates, instanced by the blaming of Berthier for the shooting accident with Masséna. Secondly, Napoleon believed so completely in his genius that he could not delegate easily, and frequently had to race from one crisis to the next in order to hold his empire together. The consequences of these flaws were soon to be exposed to all in the Russian campaign of 1812.

Unlike his rival, Arthur seemed to be as abandoned by destiny almost as often as he was favoured by it. After a gloriously successful series of campaigns that should have made a reputation that outshone that of Clive of India, Arthur returned from the subcontinent under something of a cloud, thanks to the political enemies of his older brother, Richard. That, coupled with the army’s rigid system of seniority, worked to deny Arthur the chance to demonstrate his brilliance in command. Those who knew Arthur were in no doubt about his talent, but there were few opportunities to put it to the test in the field against the armies of France. Until the decision was made to intervene in Portugal and Spain, that is.