Chapters (61)
- Title Page
- Copyright Page
- Dedication
- Chapter 1 - Napoleon
- Chapter 2 - April 1805
- Chapter 3
- Chapter 4 - Arthur
- Chapter 5
- Chapter 6 - Napoleon
- Chapter 7 - Paris, September 1805
- Chapter 8 - Strasbourg, 24 September 1805
- Chapter 9 - Ulm, 16 October 1805
- Chapter 10 - Arthur
- Chapter 11
- Chapter 12
- Chapter 13 - Napoleon
- Chapter 14
- Chapter 15 - Austerlitz, 2 December 1805
- Chapter 16 - Arthur
- Chapter 17 - Hastings, February 1806
- Chapter 18 - Dublin, April 1806
- Chapter 19
- Chapter 20 - Napoleon
- Chapter 21 - Bamberg, 7 October 1806
- Chapter 22 - Jena, 13 October 1806
- Chapter 23
- Chapter 24 - Warsaw, January 1807
- Chapter 25 - Eylau, 8 February 1807
- Chapter 26 - Arthur
- Chapter 27
- Chapter 28 - Dublin, April 1807
- Chapter 29
- Chapter 30
- Chapter 31 - Napoleon
- Chapter 32
- Chapter 33
- Chapter 34 - Arthur
- Chapter 35
- Chapter 36
- Chapter 37
- Chapter 38 - Napoleon
- Chapter 39 - Pamplona, February 1808
- Chapter 40
- Chapter 41
- Chapter 42 - Arthur
- Chapter 43 - Mondego Bay, Portugal, 30 July 1808
- Chapter 44
- Chapter 45
- Chapter 46
- Chapter 47 - Napoleon
- Chapter 48
- Chapter 49
- Chapter 50 - Arthur
- Chapter 51
- Chapter 52 - Napoleon
- Chapter 53 - Arthur
- Chapter 54 - Napoleon
- Chapter 55 - Arthur
- Chapter 56
- Chapter 57
- Author’s Note
Of course, there was an ulterior motive for much of his work. Napoleon’s lust for glory meant that he needed an efficient and well-motivated society to support the French war machine. In pursuit of this aim Napoleon was not prepared to brook any opposition and there were severe sanctions for those that corrupted the system, or refused to play their part. There is also little doubt that the power vested in the new imperial throne exacerbated a deep-seated megalomania - a characteristic that Talleyrand correctly saw as the gravest danger posed to France. Napoleon had always considered himself to be singled out by fate for greatness.As a consequence he often had little regard for others, and the hardships he subjected them to. Such people were there to serve his interests. This included not only his wife, but also his brothers and sisters, who were the tools Napoleon used to extend his dynasty across Europe.
Being destiny’s child had some unfortunate consequences for Napoleon. Firstly, it was increasingly difficult for him to accept that he could make a mistake. Accordingly, blame for his errors was lavished on his subordinates, instanced by the blaming of Berthier for the shooting accident with Masséna. Secondly, Napoleon believed so completely in his genius that he could not delegate easily, and frequently had to race from one crisis to the next in order to hold his empire together. The consequences of these flaws were soon to be exposed to all in the Russian campaign of 1812.
Unlike his rival, Arthur seemed to be as abandoned by destiny almost as often as he was favoured by it. After a gloriously successful series of campaigns that should have made a reputation that outshone that of Clive of India, Arthur returned from the subcontinent under something of a cloud, thanks to the political enemies of his older brother, Richard. That, coupled with the army’s rigid system of seniority, worked to deny Arthur the chance to demonstrate his brilliance in command. Those who knew Arthur were in no doubt about his talent, but there were few opportunities to put it to the test in the field against the armies of France. Until the decision was made to intervene in Portugal and Spain, that is.