It was then that I began to comprehend the nature of this Coalition, its uniqueness in history, and its importance as a defining aspect to future warfare. It was then that I began to treasure the—what was the right word? Brotherhood? Fellowship? The precise term didn’t come easy; we were in a new world here—which I had been too busy to comprehend since those early days of August.

For the first time I realized that this coalition was far different from the joining of forces that had occurred in World Wars I and II . . . that we were a team, not the augmented American force of the Korean War and our ill-fated attempt to fight as a coalition in Vietnam . . . that we Americans were in a position of leadership—yet were truly not in charge . . . that the other national leaders on the team were aware that we were big, had all the nicest equipment, and could be painfully self-assured and arrogant; yet that equality with us was their right and privilege—even though they could never ask for, much less demand, that status, because to do so would be an admission that we were in fact in charge.

General Lee had hit me right between the eyes. He’d made me awaken to the sacrifice it must have been for the other members—especially those from outside NATO—to trust the Americans. And suddenly I began to actually identify with my fellow airmen from this rainbow of nations, joined under a common command in a common purpose.

★ Later that week, I ran into Colonel Mohammed Al-Ayeesh in the Black Hole. This Saudi fighter pilot and Major Turki bin Bandar (called Little Turki) had been the first foreign officers to join the Black Hole planning group in September.73

In September, we had had no foreign officers assisting our planning for offensive air operations, and that had troubled me. Yet I knew that if I asked permission from Schwarzkopf, he would be concerned about security leaks and deny my request. Still, in the belief that it was better to seek forgiveness than to live a life of indecision, I’d gone to General Behery.

“Ahmed,” I said, “you must know we are planning offensive operations against the Iraqis.”

With a smile, he assured me he was well aware that all those Americans shuttling to and from the large conference room next to both our offices must have been involved in something beyond the defense of Saudi Arabia.

I then explained that I did not want to commit his nation to a war in Iraq, but we both knew that such a thing would be required if Saddam did not terminate the occupation of Kuwait.

He agreed.