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Chapters (25)
  1. Title Page
  2. Dedication
  3. Introduction
  4. I - Into the Wild Blue
  5. Chapter 1 - Every Man a Tiger
  6. Chapter 2 - The Big Lie
  7. Chapter 3 - The Vision of Bill Creech
  8. II - Shield in the Sky
  9. Chapter 4 - Mission to Jeddah
  10. Chapter 5 - CENTCOM Forward
  11. Chapter 6 - Planning the Storm
  12. Chapter 7 - Band of Brothers and Sisters
  13. III - The Thousand-Hour War
  14. Chapter 8 - Storm!
  15. Chapter 9 - Hits and Misses
  16. Chapter 10 - Lost and Found
  17. Chapter 11 - Punch and Counterpunch
  18. Chapter 12 - A Day in the War
  19. Chapter 13 - The Ten Percent War
  20. Chapter 14 - Shock and Awe
  21. Chapter 15 - Building Coalitions
  22. Chapter 16 - Beyond Iraqi Freedom
  23. Acknowledgements
  24. BIBLIOGRAPHY
  25. INDEX

During the 1700 changeover briefing, I told the troops in the TACC: “Nobody needs to feel bad about the bunker incident in Baghdad, but we all should feel bad about the loss of life, anybody’s life, because every life is precious. It doesn’t matter whether it’s an Iraqi soldier or a kid in a bunker in Baghdad, we should feel bad about the loss of one of God’s creatures. On the other hand, from a professional standpoint, we have nothing to be ashamed of. The mission was planned and executed flawlessly. The intelligence was as good as there is available. As for the people who don’t understand that war is groping in the dark trying to do dastardly things so the war will be over with, well, I don’t have much time for them. You would sure think modern, educated people would understand that truth, but many choose not to, so to hell with them. We’ll have a lot of ‘weak willies’ to worry about now. They worry about whether they’ll get up in the morning, so to hell with them. You just continue what you’re doing, because what you’re doing is right and you’re doing it very well. We’ve got to get Kuwait back to the Kuwaitis.”

Maybe if I’d had more time to think about it, I wouldn’t have made such a hard-assed speech; but I was worried that people would be overconcerned about the political cost of civilian casualties and try to shut down the air campaign. I was not wrong to worry.

Targeting in the Baghdad area all but stopped, and General Schwarzkopf began to anguish over every target we nominated, denying approval of most of them. Okay, this change was not in fact hard to accept. Most of the known high-value targets had already been destroyed or heavily damaged, and by then our main thrust had turned to destroying tanks, artillery, and lines of communication in the KTO. But a notion sticks in my throat that someone above the CINC had issued guidance based on fear of public opinion polls. This is not a fact, it’s a suspicion, and yes, civilian policy-makers must guide the warriors; but it sends trembles through me. War is political. So be it.

We eventually went back to Baghdad.

The lesson must be that war is not antiseptic, that innocent lives will be lost, that commanders in arms will kill one another. It is important that leaders at all levels do their utmost to minimize death and suffering. It must be an obsession with the commanders and planners, and of everyone who has a finger on the trigger. On the other hand, survival on the battlefield and success in war require decisive action in an ill-defined environment while using the most lethal weapons ever devised. That’s the rub. When the laser-guided bomb slips its release hooks, someone is going to die.