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Chapters (25)
  1. Title Page
  2. Dedication
  3. Introduction
  4. I - Into the Wild Blue
  5. Chapter 1 - Every Man a Tiger
  6. Chapter 2 - The Big Lie
  7. Chapter 3 - The Vision of Bill Creech
  8. II - Shield in the Sky
  9. Chapter 4 - Mission to Jeddah
  10. Chapter 5 - CENTCOM Forward
  11. Chapter 6 - Planning the Storm
  12. Chapter 7 - Band of Brothers and Sisters
  13. III - The Thousand-Hour War
  14. Chapter 8 - Storm!
  15. Chapter 9 - Hits and Misses
  16. Chapter 10 - Lost and Found
  17. Chapter 11 - Punch and Counterpunch
  18. Chapter 12 - A Day in the War
  19. Chapter 13 - The Ten Percent War
  20. Chapter 14 - Shock and Awe
  21. Chapter 15 - Building Coalitions
  22. Chapter 16 - Beyond Iraqi Freedom
  23. Acknowledgements
  24. BIBLIOGRAPHY
  25. INDEX

In their initial plans, the Pentagon planners selected thirty-seven targets associated with Saddam’s hold on Iraq. Some strikes were aimed specifically at the Iraqi leader, others at the tools or symbols of his rule, and some at targets (such as electrical power grids) whose loss would damage both the military capability of the nation and the political power of its leaders. By the start of the war, Black Hole planners had identified an additional 105 “leadership” targets, making a total of 142.

Because most of them were in Baghdad, however, the 142 targets covered a broader range than leadership. Many, such as the attack on the “AT & T building,” served to advance other strategic goals as well. The elimination of the telecommunications center not only hindered Saddam’s ability to issue political and military orders, but prevented Iraqi air defense centers from coordinating air defense.

During the first hours of the air campaign, F-117s and cruise missiles targeted command, control, and communications sites. Two-thousand-pound laser-guided bombs destroyed five major telephone exchange facilities, including the “AT&T building” and its adjacent antenna mast. Telephone switching posts were destroyed, as were bridges over the Tigris River (in order to sever fiber-optic communications cables bolted under the roadway).

Command-and-control bunkers in the presidential palaces were struck, as were command centers for the Republican Guard, the intelligence services, the secret police, the Ministry of Propaganda, and Baath Party headquarters. Most of these targets provided capabilities needed to execute military operations, and General Hussein might also have been on duty at one of them; but, more generally, they represented Saddam’s means of controlling the people of Iraq. Likewise, command post bunkers for the Iraqi Air Force and for air defense operations were attacked, both in an effort to gain control of the air and also because General Hussein might be inside directing the air defense of his nation. A number of such targets were struck in the opening moments of the war, and attacks continued throughout the war.

Did these leadership attacks hurt the Iraqis?

Yes, up to a point, and sometimes very directly: At the primary presidential palace was a hardened concrete bunker, deeply buried under a garden that came to be called the “Rose Garden,” a target so difficult it could not be destroyed by ordinary bombs. Therefore, a pair of laser bombs dug a pit in the earth that covered the concrete shelter. These were followed by a third bomb, with a hardened steel shell and a delayed fuse, which was precisely guided into the crater dug by the first bombs. Because this third bomb did not have to fight its way through tons of earth, it easily penetrated the reinforced concrete roof and exploded inside the shelter. Very bad news for anyone inside.

The attacks also made it difficult for military leaders in Baghdad to communicate with the forces in the field (which might have been a mixed blessing, given the overall foolishness of Iraqi military leadership).