The threat of bioterrorism has risen progressively in the world, particularly over the last decade. Consider the example of Aum Shinrikyo, the apocalyptic sect that released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in March 1995. At the same time the cult unleashed its chemical attack, it was engaged in an active bioweapons program involving both anthrax and botulinum toxin, just like Yuri Davydov was in the novel. They’d even gone so far as to send a delegation to Zaire to explore the possibility of obtaining the Ebola virus for weaponization.

The Soviet Union had maintained an enormous covert bio-weapons program prior to its dissolution in 1989, despite being a signatory to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) strictly forbidding such activity. At its height, the program employed more than fifty thousand scientists and technicians in research and production facilities. It was administered under the aegis of Biopreparat, which was under the Ministry of Defense. The program purportedly has been dismantled by the Yeltsin government (although many experts fear not completely), resulting in a diaspora of tens of thousands of highly trained bioweapon personnel. Considering Russia’s current economic dislocations, the question invariably arises: where are these people now and what are they doing? Some, perhaps, are driving taxis in New York City like Yuri Davydov, the disaffected emigre in Vector, and meeting up with equally disaffected members of the violent far right.

Rogue nations like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea have added to the rising threat of bioweapons. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United States and its allies were shocked to learn the size of Iraq’s stockpile of bioweapons and production facilities, whose existence had entirely eluded intelligence operations. This revelation served as a sharp wake-up call to the various allied governments. Regrettably, at the same time, the discovery captured the attention of terrorist groups and individuals worldwide who suddenly became intensely interested in bioweapons. The attraction is simple: bioweapons are inexpensive to make; require materials, equipment, and expertise that are easy to procure (some of the information is even on the Internet); and, for the most part, involve biological agents that are readily available. As an added feature, bioweapons are the best weapons of mass destruction for covert use. The effects of their release take many hours or even days to materialize, giving the perpetrators time to escape.

Adding to this unfortunate circumstance of the rising threat of bioweapons is the current social, economic, and political reality of the world. With mounting religious fundamentalism in some countries, thwarted nationalistic goals in others, economic deprivation in many, and, in the industrialized west, the increased desperation of violent far-right groups whose agenda has stalled in an era of increased globalization, there has been a worldwide rise of terrorism in general. The combination of this increase with a heightened appreciation of the evil attractiveness of bioweapons is what makes the current situation so critical.