“Because, Ivan, it changes the risk analysis. You’ve said that species are valuable as Uploads. If you aren’t being imminently forced into a course of action, then it is logical to cultivate the possibility—”

“Hold on, Doctor,” Mandelbaum interjected. “You’re advocating for Upload?”

“In the future, Commodore. And possibly willingly, by our own hand. That is how a percentage of species come up, right, Ivan?”

“That is correct. Most Uploaded species, in fact, are self-actualized.”

Dr. Kemp looked at Narang, whose brow was furrowed. Ivan’s voice was definitely changing in tone, timber, inflection, pacing—the cadence of the words had become more even, like a metronome was in charge. Someone or something else had either taken over or was heavily involved. From one point of view, that was good. From another, they needed Ivan’s influence in this discussion. If he’d been subsumed, they might have no chance at all.

“So why not wait until your hand is forced? Let us continue to develop and grow. You always have the option of going back to plan A.”

Because, on balance, the human race does not display sufficient maturity. Your value to the Uploads is questionable at this time.

The voice now had no trace left of Ivan. Kemp stopped to take a deep breath. This was the part where he bet the wad. “Assuming your analysis is correct and complete—are you familiar with the Prisoner’s Dilemma?”

There was a short silence, then Ivan came back on. It was Ivan, Ivan’s voice. “Different name, of course, but the computer is familiar with the Game Theory concept. Cooperation vs. Defection, in a Nash-Equilibrium situation.”

Kemp smiled. “Good. I submit that the ability to choose cooperation is based on the willingness to choose longer term benefits at the expense of shorter-term advantages. In our first encounter, we chose defection, and attacked. This time around, we propose to cooperate.”

There was a “What?” from Mandelbaum.

Proceed.

Kemp took a deep breath. “We can continue the cold war, each trying to seek short-term advantage, and ultimately both of us suffering; or we can seek cooperation, resulting in a short-term minor disadvantage but a longer-term payoff for both. I propose that we will choose not to blow up your nanites and comms station, and in return you will spare the human race. It’s probably too late for the other planets, I’d guess.”

What’s to stop you from defecting at a later date?

“Nothing. Nor is there anything stopping you from waking up one morning and deciding to drop a new set of nanites on Earth. That’s the whole point of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Zero control over the opponents’ motivations, thoughts, or plans. You have to depend on the cooperation being sufficiently beneficial to both sides to reduce the temptation to defect. Done properly, it’s a positive-sum game. We benefit more in the aggregate than we each would individually.”