Chapters (37)
Kierk’s eyebrows shoot up. He can’t help but show off in this type of conversation. “Isn’t it obvious by now? Human civilization, the biosphere, etcetera, becomes more and more coupled via technological advances and growing population. Like ants or cells learning to cooperate . . . Sure, we’re individuals in the early stages. But as the noosphere grows in concentration and integration, a phase transition takes place at some point. The first sign is actually the construction of cities. Eventually as a civilization becomes more concentrated, its tasks and workings more globally distributed, and its energy demands greater, it might later concentrate itself around a sun. Perhaps it builds a Dyson sphere, drawing tighter and tighter, coupling its individuals together more and more through interaction . . . It’s all merely the evolution of integration. Or the right kind of integration. Perhaps even its technology itself becomes conscious, integrates with the growing hive mind. Step-by-step it will undergo sub-Omega-Point integration ratchets until . . .” Kierk makes a gesture that indicates he can only guess.
“You’ve read Pierre Teilhard de Chardin then. I thought as much. A favorite of mine, personally,” the agent says, wiping at his forehead.
“Sure.”
“And you read a great deal of literature.”
“I suppose.”
“Do you think that’s why you’re good at this . . . line of work? I’ve always suspected that the central requirement for studying consciousness is to possess a radical form of empathy. To be able to understand what it is like to be another person: male, female, or a different orientation or age . . . But also what it is like to be a bat, or a network, or a city. Perhaps, as you indicate, even what it is like to be a post-biological group mind.”
The agent grins like he’s said something very funny.
“What do you care about any of this? DARPA, I mean.”
“Well, such post-biological group minds . . . Such hive-mind entities might be very different from us. With very different reasoning, motivations, and capabilities. Not like dealing with individual rational agents anymore. You have to throw out a lot of game-theoretic reasoning. In any . . . dealings, let’s say, with post-biological consciousnesses, we’ll need to know something about them, and of course, prepare ourselves, should they exist. We can reason with a civilization made up of individuals, but if we encountered say, artificial group minds the size of entire civilizations, well . . . First we’d need to know whether that’s possible, and, if it is possible, how to deal with such an entity. You’d need . . . radical empathy.”
“I’m sorry but why are you asking about this? Why now?”