Chapters (47)
- Cover Page
- Title Page
- Dedication
- Epigraph
- Acknowledgments
- Part One
- Chapter 1
- Chapter 2
- Chapter 3
- Chapter 4
- Chapter 5
- Chapter 6
- Chapter 7
- Chapter 8
- Chapter 9
- Chapter 10
- Chapter 11
- Chapter 12
- Chapter 13
- Chapter 14
- Chapter 15
- Chapter 16
- Chapter 17
- Chapter 18
- Chapter 19
- Chapter 20
- Chapter 21
- Chapter 22
- Chapter 23
- Part Two
- Chapter 24
- Chapter 25
- Chapter 26
- Chapter 27
- Chapter 28
- Chapter 29
- Chapter 30
- Chapter 31
- Chapter 32
- Part Three
- Chapter 33
- Chapter 34
- Chapter 35
- Historical Note
- About the Author
- Also by Conn Iggulden
- Copyright Page
At Pharsalus, Pompey commanded troops from Spain, Gaul, Germany, Syria, and Macedonia as well as Roman legionaries. Caesar gives the numbers of Pompeian cavalry as seven thousand, though it seems likely to have been an exaggeration.
The interesting incident of Pompey holding back his front line is well attested, though different reasons are suggested in various sources. My own feeling, based on Pompey’s ten deep lines, is that morale was appalling amongst his men and he saw nervousness in the ranks as Caesar’s army approached. Needless to say, it is a uniquely poor decision from the general who destroyed Spartacus and cleared the Mediterranean of pirates in forty days. The true state of Pompey’s mind can never now be known. His private papers were left behind after Pharsalus, and Julius had them burnt without looking at them.
I have followed the main events of Pharsalus as far as they are known. Pompey used his cavalry to rout Caesar’s on the right wing. It took time for Pompey’s riders to re-form and turn, and in that period Caesar’s smaller force came back and attacked them from behind, driving their own men into their lines. Caesar’s extraordinarii pushed on to destroy the archers and broke through to hit the flank and rear of Pompey’s lines. A full rout followed quickly after that.
The inescapable conclusion regarding Pharsalus is that Caesar should not have been able to win. Pompey had every advantage, but still his men folded before the veterans. Julius, it should be remembered, was a lawfully elected consul with a record of extraordinary, unprecedented shows of mercy. Corfinium is only one example in the civil war where he pardoned men who fought against him. His policy was intended to undermine Pompey in the field and it seems to have worked. I believe Pharsalus is as much a triumph of propaganda and perception as it is a military victory.
Caesar was indeed given a jar containing Pompey’s head on the docks of Alexandria. The Egyptians did not want a Roman war in their lands, though this attempt to avert one was to prove futile. Julius is recorded as having wept at the death of Pompey, though we can only guess at his reasons.
The Alexandria that Caesar would have seen is lost to the modern world. As well as the Pharos lighthouse, one of the seven ancient wonders that no longer exists, most of the streets and buildings in this book are now underwater. Modern excavations are still finding statues of Cleopatra and the son she had with Caesar, Ptolemy Caesarion.
Perhaps it is not surprising that a Roman consul who had been at war for most of his adult life should suddenly give it all up on meeting the twenty-one-year-old Cleopatra. The story of her being delivered to Caesar by her Greek attendant is well attested, though some sources say it was a long bag rather than a rolled carpet.