It was normal for defenders in the ancient world to come out from behind their walls and fight in the open during the early stages of a siege. Keeping close to the walls, sheltered by the support of archers and perhaps artillery, they might well dispute the ground outside for many days. This was a statement of confidence, which was important for morale, and at the same time meant that the attackers would not be in position to start constructing siege works for some time. Once the attackers had managed to drive in the defenders, then they could start preparing to go over, through or under the walls. Direct assaults without preparation rarely succeeded unless the defences were very weak or the defenders stretched too thinly. Therefore, it was a struggle between the attackers constructing siege works and mobile towers, rams and the like, and the defenders devising counter measures or launching sallies to destroy the siege works. At the same time both faced problems of supply, especially as the days dragged onwards. One of the reasons Hatra repulsed Trajan and later Septimius Severus was the great difficulty of supplying a large force in such arid conditions. Almost everything in the story is based on something actually attested in the period, with just a few taken from other eras. For instance the Romans did calculate the distance from a siege ramp to the wall by throwing a plumb-line. At times assaults also failed, and Roman soldiers refused to attack, for sieges were highly stressful and direct attacks costly, especially among the men inclined to be bold and take the lead.

The fate of a city that was stormed was rarely pleasant. Occasionally commanders were able to restrain their men, although even Julius Caesar would not let his soldiers enter one town that surrendered near the end of the day, for fear that he would not be able to control the legionaries once darkness fell. There is no evidence for a rule, let alone a law, that once the ram touched the wall, the defenders could expect to suffer a sack. In practice this tended to happen, and apart from the often callous attitudes of the ancient world towards other human beings, there was an assumption that the horror of a sack would help to deter other strongholds from resisting in the future. For me there is an air of tragedy about this story, as the Nicopolitans get caught up in someone else’s war and suffer appallingly as a result. Sadly that was too often the fate of communities in the ancient world, but not wishing to make an adventure story too grim, I decided against a graphic description of the sack itself.

Finally, we come to Hadrian, whose role in these years is unclear. He did spend some time in Athens before the eastern campaigns began, and since a senator needed permission to travel outside Italy, this must have been with Trajan’s approval. There is no sign that the trip was made in any official capacity, so that it represented something of a holiday, or at least an episode of private life rather than public career. He had joined Trajan at Antioch, accompanying him on the visit to the shrine of Zeus Casius, but it is unclear in what capacity, and there is no direct evidence that he became one of the emperor’s comites or companions and he does not appear to have gone to Armenia. A spell as governor or acting governor of Syria has been conjectured, and, although this is little more than a guess, the possibility worked for this story. Hadrian does not appear to have taken direct part in any of the main campaigns or accompanied Trajan to Ctesiphon. By the end of the war, he does appear to have been legate of Syria, but the appointment may well have been recent and probably a result of sending the experienced legatus off to deal with a crisis on the Danube. The appointment, and nomination for a second consulship, suggest Hadrian was back in some favour, but fell short of a full endorsement.