Back Railroad of Death
Chapters (40)
  1. FOREWORD
  2. RAILROAD OF DEATH
  3. REFERENCE LIST:
  4. Railroad of Death
  5. PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION (1948)
  6. INTRODUCTION
  7. PART ONE: SINGAPORE
  8. CHAPTER 1
  9. CHAPTER 2
  10. CHAPTER 3
  11. CHAPTER 4
  12. CHAPTER 5
  13. PART TWO: RAILROAD OF DEATH
  14. CHAPTER 6
  15. CHAPTER 7
  16. CHAPTER 8
  17. CHAPTER 9
  18. CHAPTER 10
  19. CHAPTER 11
  20. CHAPTER 12
  21. CHAPTER 13
  22. PART THREE: BASE CAMPS AND LIBERATION
  23. CHAPTER 14
  24. CHAPTER 15
  25. CHAPTER 16
  26. CHAPTER 17
  27. CHAPTER 18
  28. CHAPTER 19
  29. CHAPTER 20
  30. APPENDIX ONE:
  31. APPENDIX TWO:
  32. APPENDIX THREE:
  33. APPENDIX FOUR:
  34. APPENDIX FIVE:
  35. APPENDIX SIX:
  36. APPENDIX SEVEN:
  37. APPENDIX EIGHT:
  38. APPENDIX NINE:
  39. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
  40. And The Dawn Came Up Like Thunder
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The first case of active opposition came when the move to Kanburi was contemplated. The Lt. Cols in Tamarkan held a meeting and decided that it would be impossible to get the set to Kanburi undetected. They therefore decided that it must be left in Chungkai. The Chungkai Cols held a similar meeting and came to the same decision. This was without hearing what we had to say. Lt.Col. Owtram told us of this decision but on hearing the information we had received from Maj. Andrews and our . . . [?] . . . he agreed to take the responsibility for allowing us to try without informing the others.

The second case of opposition came after we had taken the set to Kamburi.

Lt.Col McEachern sent for us and informed us that there had been a meeting of senior Lt Col and that by a large majority they had decided (again without hearing our side of the question) that the set must be destroyed forthwith. He said that he agreed with the decision but that before giving the order he wanted to hear what we had to say.

We pointed out that the greatest risk, that of getting the set into camp, had been overcome, that accurate news kept up morale; that at any time news of vital importance to the camp might be received, and that all the necessary parts for the construction of a transmitter had been got into camp. After consideration Lt Col McEachern decided to take full responsibility for allowing us to carry on.

During this period Lt.Cols Toosey, Carpenter, Owtram, Dean & McLeod & Dobbs were vigorous in their support of our construction.

Supply

The set was operated on “Torch Light” cells and required fifty at any one time. These were used up and had to be replaced at the rate of approximately one per day.

In early 1943 contact was made with a Thai named Chal Rhoan who lived about 1½ miles from Chungkai – he volunteered to get supplies of batteries. The batteries were essential and it was necessary to trust someone – the risk was necessary. Chal Rhoan continued to supply us right to Dec. 1944 – at times he ran the greatest risks, never once did he fail us, and never once would he accept more than the actual price of the batteries. (He would not even accept out of pocket expenses for going into Bangkok).

During 1942 the collection of batteries was easy – there was no fence round the camp and the “Anti-Malaria” Party was allowed to wander at will. Supplies ordered from Chal Rhoan were brought in by the A.M. Party or the Police. Later a fence was erected round the camp and only the camp Police were allowed out without Jap guards. Lt Calderwood (A&SH) A.P.M. [Assistant Provost Marshall] with his staff R.S.M. W. How (2nd Cams) Sgt Thomas (RM) Sgt Robbins & Cpl Tough (FMSVF) undertook the bringing of supplies which continued even after the police were refused permission to leave camp. (We then would [have] to break out at night and collect.)