Back Necessity
Chapters (32)
  1. Title Page
  2. Copyright Notice
  3. Dedication
  4. Epigraphs
  5. 1. Apollo
  6. 2. Jason
  7. 3. Marsilia
  8. 4. Crocus
  9. 5. Jason
  10. 6. Marsilia
  11. 7. Jason
  12. 8. Apollo
  13. 9. Marsilia
  14. 10. Crocus
  15. 11. Jason
  16. 12. Marsilia
  17. 13. Crocus
  18. 14. Apollo
  19. 15. Jason
  20. 16. Marsilia
  21. 17. Crocus
  22. 18. Jason
  23. 19. Marsilia
  24. 20. Apollo
  25. 21. Jason
  26. 22. Marsilia’s Pod
  27. 23. Crocus
  28. 24. Apollo
  29. Thanks
  30. Books by Jo Walton
  31. About the Author
  32. Newsletter Sign-up

Simmea thought my soul must be the same as human and animal souls, and that I had probably been a human and an animal in earlier incarnations, and that I might go on to be a human in future incarnations, as she might have future incarnations as a Worker. She felt that philosophical souls had a kinship. This is what worries me about my length of life—should I choose to die, and let my soul go on? By continuing this life, am I impeding the progress of my soul? I tell myself that killing myself before I have fulfilled my Fate is cowardly, and who is to say when I have fulfilled my Fate? But then, life and death are different for Workers, and one by one I keep outliving my friends. Sometimes I wonder if what is cowardly is to refuse to die out of fear that I may have no soul after all, and that death would be the end. Sokrates did not fear death. In that, he was unusual.

Ficino believed, with Pythagoras, that all souls have a unique number, and that souls are reborn when the world adds up to their number again. He thought the numbers inscribed on the Workers could be the numbers of our souls. (Lysias said they were serial numbers and meaningless.) Ficino thought the soul would have waited from the time my body was made for my mind to develop. He cited human babies as an example—“Babies have souls long before they can reason! You must have been the same.” And he believed my soul would be a special kind, exclusive to Workers. He also believed that animal and human souls were different, on which point Pytheas assures me he was mistaken. Ficino did not live long enough to see Pytheas revealed at the Relocation, which is sad, as I am sure he would have had excellent questions and rejoiced in the answers.

Ikaros believed that my soul would have left Lethe and come to me when I was ready for it—“As soon as you needed it, but no sooner,” he said. At the time he said this, he was a man and not a god, and had no more knowledge than he could gain by learning, deduction, and intuition. Since he has been taken up to Olympos, I have had no opportunity to converse with him.

Klio thought my soul would have evolved along with my self-awareness, and she thought the same was true of babies. Pytheas says she was definitely wrong about this in the case of babies, and he never heard of souls evolving, but they must have come from somewhere in the first place.

I have faith in the existence of my soul, but no real evidence. This is one of my greatest burdens.

IV. On the Good Life (Part 1)